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L INTRODUCTION 
One of my experienced colleagues frequently reminds me that 
we live in a world of sovereign states in which there is a pervasive 
sense of egalitarianism resulting from claims to legal equality. 
Admittedly, national sovereignty is a hardy crustacean. It poss-
esses a certain mysterious majesty of its own. Its mythology is 
constantly and unhesitatingly being promoted by world figures. 
But it has its critics, if not its detractors. They remind us, as 
Judge Phillip C. Jessup once noted: "Sovereignty is a quicksand. If 
one tries to build upon it, the entire legal structure sinks and 
perishes. Sovereignty in the sense of the unregulated will of 
States to do as they please is absDlutely incompatible with the in-
ternational rule of law." 1 
As an international legal principle, there is a need to secure 
the application of sovereignty in the service of all mankind. Narrow 
nationalist perceptions of national well-being must be judged 
these days from a world community perspective. Only through a 
global approach can the true national well-being of states be ad-
vanced. This frequently shared value orientation has particular 
application to the world-wide dissemination of data, information, 
and ideas. Such an outlook also has direct application to policies af-
fecting the distribution of extra-territorial and "invisible" 
resources. 2 In the process of applying the principle of sovereignty 
to the resolution of such matters, international negotiations will 
be the preferred format. In such deliberations, participants will 
seek accommodation based on values assigned to such factors as 
cultural integrity, unhindered opportunities to communicate, the 
formation of a world culture, economic interests, and concerns 
respecting national security. 
Taking these considerations as a starting point, the need then 
emerges to deal with specifics in a pragmatic way. In applying in-
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telligence to facts in the formulation of policy, it is important to 
begin by searching for the facts. Realizing this, it can be readily 
acknowledged that ultimate facts are more hypothetical then real. 
Even the most "concrete" facts are frequently quite slippery and 
have the capacity of transforming themselves under scrutiny. 
This, in the best sense, is the product of the ongoing research of 
our scientific and technology-oriented colleagues. One must also be 
aware that honest research appraisals are frequently demeaned 
on the grounds that they are incomplete or are biased as a conse-
quence of the economic, social, or political orientations of their 
proponents. N onethless, the policy process produces the soundest 
results when put into .action following an initial search for all of 
the objectively ascertainable facts. For example, until now much 
. . 
of the debate of the United Nation's Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), and at the World Administrative 
Radio Conferences (W ARCs) of the International Telecommunica-
tion Union (ITU) has been based on the assumption that Direct 
Broadcast Satellites (DBS) will be available for successful commer-
cial operation in the not too distant future. 
As I make this observation respecting the formation of world 
policy, I am reminded of an experience I once had discussing the 
process of international negotiations with a highly placed Finnish 
official. Upori being advised by him that he had found it easy to 
carry on high-level negotiations with a Soviet counterpart, I ex-
pressed surprise. I was reassured, if not entirely satisfied, by the 
following distinction. The Finn pointed out that there were objec-
tive facts and subjective facts. Once the negotiators were able to 
concentrate their attention on the subjective facts, I was told, the 
negotiations could be brought to an ascertainable conclusion. 
This brief recapitulation is relevant . to an assessment of the 
sharing of resour.ces, finite or infinite, when one accepts the pro-
position that states, like individuals, possess acquisitive impulses. 
When the details of sharing are being considered there are many 
practical considerations to be taken into account; the "true" facts 
are not always the most weighty. This is not to say that the ad-
vanced states do not have a major responsibility to bring their 
research facts and conclusions to the attention of their less well in-
formed counterparts from the other parts of the world. Indeed, 
they do. 
Additionally, it is perfectly obvious that the ideological dif-
ferences among states and regions will have a heavy impact upon 
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the policy equation of the international agreement process. It is 
generally accepted, for instance, that the countries of the West, 
under the influence of freedom-oriented traditions flowing from 
the Age of Enlightenment and before, have a bias in the area of 
human rights. These countries are the proponents of civil and 
political rights and liberties. Countries of the socialist bloc follow 
the beat of a different drummer. They prefer to espouse economic, 
social, and cultural rights. This has been translated by them into a 
concern for needs, as opposed to the Western orientation toward 
rights. 
In an assessment of the respective rights and duties of states 
in any area of competition, conflict, cooperation, or reconciliation it 
is necessary to take into account a decisional process that is 
measurably, but not totally, influenced by facts as well as by 
preferred policy considerations. A blendiI].g of the relevant ingre-
dients is to be expected. Thus, when an assessment is made of the 
use of geostationary orbital positions for electronic transmissions 
throughout the world, as well as the availability to states of 
facilities for domestic broadcasts, some bargaining must be ex-
pected. This is especially true at a time when there has been an ex-
plosive increase of states, which in turn has had such conse-
quences as demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
and for a New International Information Order (NIIO). 
IL THE STRUCTURAL SETTING 
National concerns relating to the dissemination of "informa-
tion," in the broadest sense of the term, have found expression in 
a number of international org3:nizations. Among the most promi-
nent of these have been the United Nations, the International Tele-
communication Union (ITU), and the United Nations Economic, 
Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). At the United Na-
tions·, principal efforts have been undertaken by the General 
Assembly's 53 member Council on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS), Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The United Na-
tions also employed the conference process to inquire into specific 
issues. For example, in 1979 it convened a Conference on Science 
and Technology for Development. At present a plan is being 
developed for the Second U .N. Conference on the Exploration and 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. At the ITU, decisions have been 
made in p·eriodic general conferences of the Union, at either 
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general or special W ARCs, or at regional radio conferences. 
UNESCO, through the drafting of formal agreements and the 
adoption of resolutions, as well as through the preparation of a 
series of research reports and studies, has been identified with 
mass communications since 1948. 
The comparative utility of the three forums mentioned above, 
the UN, the ITU, and UNESCO will be examined subsequently. Each 
has had a different orientation respecting the identification of law 
and policy related to world-wide mass communications. Each has 
addressed itself somewhat differently to issues over time. It is 
clear that each has had a role to play. Of course, the special out-
looks that have been raised in one forum have also been heard in 
the other forums, although possibly in a muted or less specific 
fashion. 
Several important differences exist between these organiza-
tions. Of the three, UNESCO has been the most heavily politicized 
forum in which outer space communications have been considered. 
It is the institution where the United States' commitment to arti-
cle 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has taken the 
severest battering. It is the only one of the three institutions in 
which withdrawal has been given reluctant thought. Until the pre-
sent at least, COPUOS, with its fairly small membership, and 
despite its responsibilities in the political-legal arena, as well as in-
volvement in scientific and technical areas, has not been severely 
affected by either East-West or North-South tensions. To the ex-
tent that substantial differences have arisen respecting the issue 
of prior consent on the part of a receiving state for a foreign 
broadcast, the debates have generally been among the supporters 
of civil and political rights and liberties. Canada and Sweden have 
been on one side and on the other has been principally the United 
States. Recent shifts have resulted in a reduction among the pro-
ponents of prior consent. 
The ITU, as a specialized agency of the United Nations com-
posed of over 150 states and operating on a one-state one-vote 
basis, has the responsibility for assuring that the radio spectrum 
be used to advance community interests. Although originally con-
ceived to bear only technical responsibilities, it has become in-
creasingly clear that fulfillment of ITU duties cannot be separated 
from political-legal security considerations. The union meets its 
responsibilities through periodic ITU conferences and through its 
world-wide and regional World Administrative Radio Con-
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ferences. In recent years it has been engaged in essentially non-
stop legislative conferences. The 1971 W ARC on space telecom-
munications and the 1977 W ARC on broadcasting satellite ser-
vices demonstrated that technically based decisions can be reached 
in the face of real but muted political claims. The same held true of 
the 1979 W ARC, although the issues before it were potentially ex-
plosive from a political perspective. 
Ill ASSESSMENT OF ROLES OF THE FOREGOING 
INSTITUTIONS 
Before analyzing the respective roles of these three interna-
tional organizations in the area of mass communications, reference 
must be made to the principle of national sovereignty. In applying 
the principle of sovereignty to mass communications emanating 
from space objects, it is necessary to be aware of either the ir-
relevance of sovereignty or at least its essential neutrality. The 
foregoing statement needs to be placed in the context of possible 
future broadcasts from the space object of one state into receivers 
located in another state, and in particular, direct or indirect broad-
casts into home or community receivers. Relying only on the prin-
ciple of sovereignty, and in the absence of limitations imposed 
either by formal international law and by its constant companion, 
namely customary international law, it is submitted that it would 
be perfectly lawful for a state to engage in such broadcasts and to 
authorize its nationals to do so. By the same token, of course, it 
would also be within the sovereign rights of the receiving state to 
prevent the reception of such broadcasts. The situation can be 
described as one of clashing, co-equal sovereignties rather than 
one of higher sovereignty being accorded to either the sending or 
receiving state. A similar observation may be made in reference to 
remote sensing through the utilization of space objects. 
The foregoing conclusion is supported by the most relevant 
formal international agreement in this area, the 1967 COPUOS 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies.3 In article 1 of the COPUOS Treaty, provision 
3. More than eighty states are bound by the Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies, done January 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 
U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force for United States on October 10, 1967). 
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was made for the free and equal access to, and exploration, use, and 
exploration of the space environment. In establishing national 
rights and obligations the Treaty neither prohibited nor authorized 
broadcasts from space objects. Since it is accepted that the scope of 
international agreements is generally restrictive, it may be conclud-
ed that, in the absence of specific prohibitions, receiving and sending 
states cannot legitimately claim violation of national sovereignty. 
In the early 1970s the practical prospects for the mass commun-
ication of data, information, and ideas by way of Direct Broadcast 
Satellites (DBS) were becoming more apparent. All three of the in-
ternational organizations examined here have dealt with the sub-
ject. In doing so they have become intensely involved in the 
following: the varying interests, values, wants, and needs of their 
respective decisional processes, with COPUOS arriving at deci-
sions via consensus; the sizes of the different institutions; the ideo-
logical preferences of the members; the perceptions held within 
the several institutions of their prerogatives; and their experi-
ences in dealing with scientific and technical matters as opposed 
to more wide-ranging political and philosophical issues. Despite 
these considerations, or perhaps because of them, the general in-
terest in both the method and subject matter of communications 
has been so wide-ranging that it has not been possible to confine con-
sideration of the subject to one institution. From the UN's interest 
in direct television broadcasts beginning in 1968, UNESCO's con-
cern for the freedom of information dating back to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, to the ITU's involvement in 
the use of radio frequencies by space objects dating back to 1971, 
there were many forces at work leading to the present interest in 
a NIIO. 
IV. THE ROLE OF UNESCO 
In addition to the interests previously identified it is 
necessary to call attention to other national preferences that will 
certainly affect the form and substance of the proposed NIIO. At 
UNESCO, as early as 1948, a resolution was adopted upon the in-
itiative of the United States, recommending that members "recog-
nize the right of citizens to listen freely to broadcasts from other 
countries."4 This was followed by United States support for a 1969 
4. UNESCO, Records of the General Conference, 3d Sess., vol. 2, UNESCO Doc. 3 
C/Resolution 7.2221 (1959). 
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UNESCO Resolution 4.14, dealing with the promotion of the use of 
space communications to further UNESCO's aims. Among that Re-
solution's provisions was an authorization to the Secretary-
General "to collect and disseminate information and to promote 
studies and research on the use of space communication for the 
free flow of information, the rapid spread of education and greater 
cultural exchange." This seemed quite in keeping with the Amer-
ican tradition of the free communication of data, information, and 
ideas. 
In 1972, UNESCO, with its mission of eliminating human ig-
norance, adopted a "Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use 
of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information, the 
Spread of Education and Greater Cultural Exchange."5 This 
Declaration recognized the fact that DBS constituted a new dimen-
sion in international communications. The United States, however, 
expressed opposition to the terms and content of the Declaration. 
Among the reasons advanced for the opposition was the absence 
of a useful definition of terms. It was also suggested that the 
Declaration did not adequately deal with numerous issues, and 
that its general approach toward direct broadcasting was neg-
ative. Finally, there was opposition to the principle that would 
have required prior consent to such broadcasts by a receiving 
state. The Declaration was considered to constitute a hazard to 
the free flow of facts, information, and ideas, and as such, stood in 
conflict with the basic goals of UNESCO. 
By the early 1970s, lesser developed countries (LDCs) were 
becoming aware of the potential of space-based communications. 
Through membership and participation in UNESCO, the UN, and 
the ITU, they came to realize that the extent of a state's develop-
ment could partly be gauged by its communication capabilities. In 
the process of modernization they have endeavored to move into 
the era of mass communications. They perceive mass communica-
tions as a two-way street in which governments can reach their 
populations, and the people can express their wishes to the 
government. In endeavoring to identify the structures best suited 
to meet the need for the distribution of data, information, and 
ideas, certain domestic tensions have surfaced. In response, 
governments have sought to clarify the impact of government on 
media practitioners. Practitioners have been treated as a part of 
5. UNESCO, Records of the General Conference, 17th Sess., vol. l, UNESCO Doc. 17 
C/Resolution 4.111 (1972). 
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the total paraphernalia of the state. The extent to which public 
controls have been imposed has, of course, varied from country to 
country. 
Supported by the lesser developed countries, but led by East-
ern European nations, the 1976 agenda of the UNESCO General 
Conference included consideration of a "Draft Universal Declar-
ation on Fundamental Principles Governing the Use of the Mass 
Media in Strengthening Peace and International Understanding 
and in Combatting War Propaganda, Racism and Apartheid."6 In 
assessing the terms of the draft Declaration, the representative of 
the United States pointed out that it posed a conflict between 
ideologies with respect to mass media, a conflict which was essen-
tially political. He characterized its terms as reflecting "the views 
of some nations that regard the mass media as a political arm of 
the State. It reflects the view that information media is to be used 
as a tool or an implement to further the aims and objectives of the 
State."7 Thus, on political and constitutional grounds it was 
asserted that further negotiations were in order. Although sup-
port for the Declaration has grown, the United States has main-
tained its original opposition. 
The recent effort at UNESCO to formulate a NIIO has been a 
cause for concern in the United States.8 This stems from the def-
inition accorded to the NIIO in a recent UNESCO study. There it 
was defined as the "international exchange of information in 
which States, which develop their cultural systems in an auto-
nomous way and with complete sovereign control of resources, fully 
and effectively participate as independent members of the interna-
tional community ."9 One cannot help but be impressed with the ag-
gressive assertion of national sovereignty as opposed to loyalty to 
the general interests of the world community reflected in the 
quoted definition. 
UNESCO's role in the formulation of a NIIO appears to be at 
6. UNESCO Doc. 19 C/Resolution 91 (1976). 
7. UNESCO, Records of the General Conference, 17th Sess., vol. 2, pt. 2 (36th mtg.) 
435, 458 (1976). 
8. UNESCO Meeting Adopts Compromise Dedaration of Mass Media Question, 15 
U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, No. 11, p. 54 (1978). 
9. Hamelink, The New InJernational Economic Order and the New International In-
formation Order (UNESCO International Commission for the Study of Communication 
Problems), Rep. No. 34, p. 8; M. MASMOUDI, THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER (UNESCO 
International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems), Rep; No. 31, 1978; 
MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD (UNESCO International Commission for the Study of Commun-
ication Problems) (S. MacBride ed. 1980). 
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odds with article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Article 19 provides that "[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of fron-
tiers."10 The NIIO, as defined, would constrain the rights of the in-
dividual as set out in article 19. 
V. THE ROLE OF COPUOS 
In the early 1960s, COPUOS, assisted by the UN Secretariat, 
began to display an interest in direct communications. In its April 
1967 meeting, COPUOS examined the matter with some care. 
Following action by the General Assembly, a Working Group met 
in February 1969 to consider technical and economic problems 
associated with DBS:It was able to consider a joint working paper 
presented by Canada and Sweden, another from the United 
States, and an ITU statement. 
Subsequently the Soviet Union obtained the support of its 
allies, many of the lesser developed countries, and France for a 
COPUOS statement of principles based on the 1972 UNESCO De-
claration. These states favored the view that it would be nec-
essary for a broadcasting state to receive the permission of a 
receiving state prior to engaging in or authorizing a broadcast. 
Beginning in 1970, Canada and Sweden have put forward a 
series of proposals which, although periodically modified, have 
favored a principle of prior consent by a receiving state. Most 
recently these states have called for advance agreement on broad-
casts from satellites without reference to the content of such 
transmissions. The United States has not accepted their joint pro-
posals, since such a concession to the control of the dissemination 
of information by this technical means could have an adverse im-
pact on the free and unhindered dissemination of information 
throughout the world. From a practical perspective, any such re-
striction on the free flow of information might cause the U.S. 
Senate to reject an agreement containing those constraints. Even 
if the COPUOS-based proposal were to take the form of a State-
ment of Principles, rather than a formal agreement, it would be 
difficult for the United States to accept it in the light of its historic 
support for the freest possible dissemination of data, information, 
and ideas. 
10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/811 (December 10, 1948). 
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The United States has opposed the inclusion of a provision re-
quiring prior consent in the COPUOS-sponsored principles. In sup-
port of its position the United States has made several arguments. 
First, it has asserted that until adequate practical experience has 
been gained in the use of DBS, no international political limita-
tions on use should be imposed. Second, it has contended that un-
necessary political restraints would reduce the use of satellites 
and thus inhibit the growth of space technology. Third, it has 
argued that existing ITU regulations are adequate to deal with 
present problems. Specifically, it has pointed out that article 7, 
section 428A of the 1971 Radio Regulations provides that, "[i]n 
devising the characteristics of a space station in the broadcasting-
satellite service, all technical means available shall be used to 
reduce, to the maximum extent practieable, the radiation over the 
territory of other countries unless an agreement has been 
previously reached with such countries." 11 
The provision relied on by the United States was restated 
without change as rule 6222 at the 1979 W ARC. The rule constit-
utes a formal restraint on the means available to broadcasting 
states in their domestic broadcasts to the extent that such broad-
casts may have international consequences. Rule 6222 can be 
treated as a limitation on the guarantee of article 1 of the Prin-
ciples Treaty that signatories have freedom in the exploration, 
use, and exploitation of the space environment. The United States 
has subscribed to the rule on the grounds that its function is to 
protect the effective use of the broadcast spectrum. Concerns ex-
ist, however, that a requirement for technical coordination might 
constitute a form of prior consent and thereby raise constitutional 
issues.12 
The issue of prior consent has posed seemingly insuperable 
difficulties for the United States. Regretably, the issue has pro-
duced clashes among co-supporters of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, including members of COPUOS whose unremit-
ting commitments to free and robust expression of ideas corres-
pond with those of the United States. In 1975, in an effort to avoid 
the issue of prior consent, the United States urged at the UN that 
any system of DBS should include a plan for full consultations 
11. Partial Revision of the Radio Regulations, done July 17, 1971, 23 U.S.T.1527, 1648, 
T.l.A.S. No. 7435. 
12. For an assessment of United States constitutional problems, see, Note, Toward 
the Free Flow of Information: Direct Television Broadcasting via Satellite, 13 J. INT'L L. 
ECON. 329, 350-56 (1979). 
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among the concerned states. The United States proposal reads: 
We are proposing that before direct television broadcasting 
is undertaken, States within the reception area should be not-
ified of the intention to broadcast. Those who broadcast should 
be prepared, on a reciprocal basis, to assume an obligation to 
give formal notification to States within the likely broadcast 
area. In addition, those who broadcast should agree to consult 
fully with the governments of the States in the intended recep-
tion area if the latter so request, with the intention of making 
good faith efforts to reconcile problems which may be raised. 
We believe that this approach would offer protection for any 
State which has legitimate concerns about direct television 
broadcasting into its territory, without establishing an interna-
tional scheme based on prior consent. We do not envisage 
establishment through these procedures of a right of any State 
to prohibit others from undertaking broadcasting. We do en-
visage that such notification and consultation requirements 
would go substantially beyond the technical consultations now 
provided for within the ITU .13 
Adherence to the foregoing approach, it was hoped, would 
facilitate consultations so that differences would be quickly and 
easily reconciled. In particular, potential receivers would be pro-
vided with a full opportunity to resolve foreseeable problems. It 
was also noted that consultations would be incumbent on broad-
casters because of their unwillingness to alienate prospective 
audiences. While maintaining the same approach in 1979, the 
United States observed that a sending state would not be accorded 
a wholly unrestricted broadcast opportunity. In its 1979 submis-
sion, the United States indicated that a broadcasting state would 
be obliged to "take into account and give due regard to the in-
terests and concerns of the foreign State in regard to the proposed 
service ... "14 
In an attempt to overcome the existing deadlock, there have 
13. This was consistent with Secretary Kissinger's 1975 statement relating to broad-
casting satellites. He indicated that the United States was committed to greater com-
munication and the wider exchange of ideas. But, he said, "we recognize that there must be 
full consultation among the countries concerned." International Law, World Order, and 
Human Progress, 73 DEPT. STATE BULL. 353, 359 (1975). 
14. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C. 2/L.118 (March 22, 1979); U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/240, Annex 4, 
p. 5 (April 10, 1979). For an excellent analysis of the contributions of Canada and Sweden, 
see Chapman and Warren, Direct Broadcast Satellites: The ITU, UN and the Real World, 4 
ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 413 (1979). 
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been suggestions that it might be possible for negotiators to settle 
for content guidelines or parameters of conduct. These, presum-
ably, would be fashioned in such a manner as to protect fragile cul-
tures from inroads and influences emanating from states poss-
essing advanced capabilities for information dissemination. Such 
proposals appear to have little chance of success. Past history has 
indicated a myriad of responses to efforts to define or to isolate 
the substantive content, for example, of propaganda, war-mong-
ering, racism, and bigotry. Efforts to define and to control accept-
able cultural patterns have also failed. It may well be that we are 
edging toward a world culture and that the principle of a free flow 
of information will inevitably prevail over concerns for a formally 
prescribed morality, a localized cultural integrity, and even nar-
row views of national sovereignty. However, in the world comm-
unity, as in smaller and more discrete associations, good manners 
have substantial value. With the free flow of information it will 
always be possible to lodge suitable protests against breaches of 
propriety however interpreted by unwilling recipients. 
VL THE ROLE OF THE ITU 
If, as appears to be the case, COPUOS in its rational and low-
keyed approach toward creating a consensus respecting formal 
limitations on DBS has not been able to reach agreement, is there 
any greater likelihood that formal or informal rules can be achieved 
in other fora? What is the situtation at the ITU and in its world-
wide and regional WARCs? In these settings the negotiators have 
been charged, pursuant to article 33 of the 1973 ITU Convention 
with arranging the disposition of frequency bands for space radio 
services and geostationary orbital positions so that these 
resources will "be used efficiently and economically so that coun-
tries or groups of countries may have equitable access to both in 
conformity with the provisons of the Radio Regulations according 
to their needs and the technical facilities at their disposal."15 
Unlike the focus at COPUOS on "prior consent," the members 
of the ITU have sought to regulate access to and the use of radio 
frequencies so as to avoid interferences in the broadcasting of 
messages through the multiple and uncoordinated uses of a given 
15. International Telecommunication Convention, done October 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 
2495, 2529, T.l.A.S. No. 8572 (Entered into force for the United States on April 7, 1976). 
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wavelength. The ITU has built a practice around such concepts as 
"assignments," "allocations," and new proposals relating to 
"allotments." These words have important technical meanings as 
they relate to the use of the broadcast spectrum. The ITU 
allocates frequencies by services, such as the broadcast satellite 
service, to three geographical regions. States make assignments of 
specific wavelengths to broadcasters who operate within the in-
dicated state. States record these nationally-identified 
assignments with the International Frequency Registration Board 
(IFRB) of the ITU. The term "allotment" has recently entered the 
vocabulary of the ITU because of the efforts of various countries, 
particularly the LDCs, to obtain a priori distributions of indicated 
wavelengths. 
At the present time a state or its nationals can begin to use a 
wavelength through the publication by the state of a national 
assignment. This is followed by national notification to the IFRB 
that the country wishes the assignment to be entered on the 
registry of the Board. As a result of this practice the expression 
"first-come, first-served" has come into vogue as the purported 
basis for the distribution of frequency uses. Although such uses do 
not create proprietary rights in the radio spectrum, less devel-
oped countries, having entered the arena after many frequen-
cies have been allocated, have had to engineer their systems 
around the earlier ones.16 
The LDCs have been fearful that radio frequencies and 
geostationary orbital positions have been preempted by the ex-
isting activities and practices of the space-resource states. In 
response, they have sought priorities respecting spectra and, 
possibly, orbital positions. At the 1979 W ARC, they urged that 
they should receive "allotments" now, even though they may not 
have demonstrated a present capability to use and exploit such 
resources. The concept of "allotments," then, can be likened to 
that of "assignments," the difference being that "assignments" are 
the product of national action, whereas "allotments" would be the 
product of an international decision by a W ARC. 
The role of planning as a means for effecting distributions of 
frequencies, including possible future allotments on an a priori 
16. Jackson, Allocation of the Radio Spectrum, 242 SCIENTIFIC AM. 34, 38-39 (1980); 
see generally White and Holmes, The Future of Commercial Satellite Telecommuciations, 2 
QUEST 46 (1978). 
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basis to the lesser developed countries, has come under some 
criticism. As a spokesman for advanced states, the United States 
has been opposed to such "warehousing" of frequencies. It has 
urged that allocations be made only when there is a need to use 
the frequency. In assessing the 1979 WARC, Professor G.O. 
Robinson, Chairman of the United States Delegation stated: 
The Third World fears of being preempted by earlier 
developed country exploitation actually were belied by ex-
perience, because no one could show that there had been any 
such preemption, despite 'considerable satellite activity by both 
developing and developed countries. The argument that preemp-
tion will not happen failed at W ARC, and it probably will fail at 
the future planning conference because it cannot be proved that 
no country will ever be denied reasonable access to the spectrum 
or orbit. Such proofs are in the realm of religion, not engineer-
ing, and the protagonists do not share the same faith. 11 
Nonetheless, it was agreed that upon proof of actual need, less 
developed countries might achieve future guaranteed options to 
certain orbital positions or allotments, strictly limited to a few fre-
quencies and positions.18 
If "allotments" were to be used, with specific distributions of 
frequencies to states being made by a W ARC, the existing prac-
tice of the ITU in accepting registration of national assignments 
after the frequency had been put into use would have to be 
substantially modified. Legally, it is doubtful that such prospec-
tive allotments by the ITU could be sustained under article 2 of 
the Principles Treaty, since the article prohibits acquisition of na-
tional sovereignty over any part of the space environment by any 
means. This prohibition applies to the acts of states and interna-
tional organizations. 
During the 1979 WARC, advanced states vigorously opposed 
the a priori (e.g. allotments prior to need of space resources) pro-
posals of the lesser developed countries. The advanced states in-
dicated that establishment of such a practice would conflict with 
the criteria established in article 33 of the ITU Convention. They 
also sought to convince the lesser developed countries that suit-
able frequencies would be available at such time as those lesser 
17. Robinson, Regulating International Airwaves: The 1979 WARC, 21 VA. J. INT"L L. 
45 (1980). 
18. Id. at 46. 
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developed countries could demonstrate actual capacity to make 
use of them. Concurrently, the advanced states acknowledged the 
present or potential need on the part of the lesser developed coun-
tries. As has often been the case in international negotiations 
when agreement cannot be reached, it was decided to postpone 
further consideration of the matter. The matter will be considered 
at a forthcoming conference. 
These circumstances have a direct impact on the underlying 
premise of the NIIO. The lesser developed countries, through 
management of their own communications, seek to receive and im-
part data, information, and ideas most favorable to them. It is 
their opinion that nationalistic goals could be promoted through 
ownership and operation of national space objects. National cul-
ture could be protected against the intrusion of the outside world. 
In addition, these nations believe, transmitting capabilities would 
enable them to design and broadcast the materials deemed most 
needed by or useful to their citizens. This could relate, for exam-
ple, to agricultural, health, sanitation, and general educational 
needs. In fact, this was the preference indicated by India in 1973, 
when plans were being made for the 1975 joint venture between 
the United States and India known as the Satellite Instructional 
Television Experiment (SITE).19 
The United States is obliged, pursuant to section 102 (b) of 
the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, to make telecommunica-
tions services available to developing countries.20 According to 
this statute, the United States must promote the efficient and 
economical use of the electromagnetic frequency spectrum so that 
its benefits become available to all mankind. To obtain such goals, 
a system of worldwide communications open to all nations, and 
based on international cooperation has become operational. 
Although it accepts the value of international telecommunications, 
the United States also recognizes that great benefits and enor-
mous financial savings can result from domestic communications 
systems. Recognition has been given to the special requirements 
of the LDCs, in particular their need to minimize costs for 
19. Christol, Space Joint Ventures: The United States and Developing Nations, 8 U. 
AKRON L. REV. 404 (1974); see also Jasentuliyana, Third World Perspectives of Space 
Technology, in SPACE ACTIVITIES AND IMPLICATIONS: WHERE FROM AND WHERE To AT THE 
THRESHOLD OF THE '80s 261 (1981). 
20. Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1976). 
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materials and labor in the installation of such systems. States with 
large expanses of territory will be the principal beneficiaries of 
such recognition. 
It should be noted that a very considerable change of em-
phasis in this area has taken place in the past five years. In the 
mid-1970s there were extensive joint efforts by the LDCs and the 
advanced states aimed at providing more and better communica-
tions. While this practice has continued, and has been of major 
benefit, at the present time the lesser developed countries' em-
phasis has turned to national television and satellite systems for 
communications purposes. If such national systems are to be suc-
cessful and do service to a NIIO, it will be necessary for the lesser 
developed countries to be assured of access to orbital positions 
and the use of identifiable broadcast spectra. These demands are 
being voiced with a certain urgency because the lesser developed 
countries recognize that the advanced states are continuing to put 
operating communications satellites into geostationary orbital 
positions. Moreover, the lesser developed countries have a certain 
distrust of the often-stated position of the states currently able to 
exploit space resources that the "first-come, first-served" formula 
does not confer any property or proprietary rights on existing 
users. 
Since W ARCs operate on a one-state one-vote basis, there 
was concern prior to and even during the 1979 WARC that the 
conference would become politicized along the lines of the NIIO 
dialogue. That prognosis was not realized. This can be attributed, 
in part, to the fact that the participants were essentially technical 
specialists. Nonetheless, indicative of the potential for politiciza-
tion was the view heard at the Conference that the advanced 
states should develop broadcasts and the reception of impulses on 
single sideband receivers for the benefit of the lesser developed 
countries, as well as provide "the technology, and the capital in-
vestment to use it, free without patents, trade marks or license 
fees." 21 
The specialists participating in the WARCs realize better 
than most, that the intangible resources of the space environment 
are both exceedingly valuable and not infinite. They also realize 
that science and technology are constantly evolving and that over 
time more efficient and creative ways to exploit present resources 
21. Raghavan, 7 DEVELOPMENT FORUM 10 (1979). 
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will be developed, requiring only the application of suitable 
management procedures. 
Major attention has focused on the free exploitation or a post-
iori approach and favored by advanced states, and the highly plan-
ned specific allotment, or a priori model, supported by LDCs. As a 
further alternative, speculations have been raised concerning the 
allocation of orbits and spectra by way of a market formula. One 
commentator, in supporting such a means to effect distributions, 
has stated that although this might seem unfair to the poorer states 
"relative wealth is not the only determinant of resource distribution: 
relative utility and intensity of demand are equally important." 22 
Such an approach could render obsolete the allocation process, 
particularly if it were agreed that states holding allotments could 
transfer such allotments to other users. The argument is that an 
allotment plan is per se inefficient, and that a need exists to main-
tain the mandate of equitable use. If limited transfers of 
allotments among different countries by way of a market in radio 
frequencies were allowed, the result would be a system "enor-
mously more responsive to efficiency interests while remaining 
reasonably faithful to equity considerations."23 
VIL ROLE FOR EQUITY 
In the distribution of intangible and tangible resources of the 
world there is increasing authority to support the application of 
principles of equity. In this connection it is appropriate to recall 
that: 
It has been perceived that all human beings are members of 
the human race no matter whether they live in the "North" or 
the "South," whether their loyalties are given to technologically 
advanced or disadvantaged States, and whether their ideologies 
support the cause of freedom or statism. Many of the advanced 
States, for example, have cooperated to ameliorate the pressing 
burdens of poverty in the LDCs, through what is known as 
development assistance. This has its foundations in moral con-
cerns, since the history of mankind has been based on the pro-
position that the rich and powerful possess a moral obligation to 
aid those less favorably endowed. The sense of sharing has come 
to be considered as a precurser of a global fairness revolution.24 
22. Robinson, supra note 17, at 49. 
23. Id. at 51. 
24. Christol, The Common Heritage of Mankind Provison in the 1979 Agreement 
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Such considerations have induced states to enter into formal 
agreements whereby they have determined that principles of equity 
should be applicable to the distribution of benefits derived from 
exploitative endeavors. 
The willingness of the world community to equitably distrib-
ute benefits derived from res communis areas can be amply illus-
trated. In regard to the use of radio frequencies and the geosta-
tionary orbital position, attention has already been called to article 
33 of the 1973 ITU Convention. Article 11, para. 7(d) of the 1979 
Moon Treaty prescribes equitable sharing by the parties in bene-
fits derived from the moon and its natural resources. The Moon 
Treaty also provides that in effecting such a sharing, special con-
sideration is to be given to "the interests and needs of the devel-
oping countries, as well as the efforts of those countries which 
have contributed either directly or indirectly to the exploration of 
the Moon."25 Equitable principles must also be considered in deter-
mining the compensation paid by a launching state should it incur 
liability to pay damages pursuant to article 12 of the 1972 Interna-
tional Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects Conven-
tion.26 The principle of equity has recently been incorporated in 
several of the articles of the current draft Convention on the Law 
of the Sea.27 For example, article 69, para. 1 provides that land-
locked states shall have the right to equitable participation in the 
exploitation of certain living resources, while account is taken of 
relevant economic and geographical circumstances of all the con-
cerned states. Article 140, para. 2, of the same draft agreement, in 
delineating the manner in which activities are to be carried on in a 
sea area, imposes a duty to provide for the equitable sharing of 
financial and other economic benefits derived from any activities. 
The foregoing examples are reflected in several portions of 
the current COPUOS draft "Principles Governing the Use by States 
of Artifical Earth Satellites for [International] Direct Television 
Broadcasting."28 In the draft's preamble attention is called to the 
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 14 INT'L L. 429, 
452-53 (1980). 
25. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, U.N. Doc. A/34/664 (1979); 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1434 (1979). 
26. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, March 
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 2397, T.l.A.S. No. 7762. 
27. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 3/Add. 1 (1980); 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1129 
(1980). 
28. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/271, Annex, p. 6 (1980). 
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desire "to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of all 
States and to encourage orderly development on an equitable 
basis of this new and promising means of television broadcast-
ing. "29 Also, in the proposed principle on the applicability of inter-
national law, reference is made to the 1973 ITU Convention as 
having application to direct television broadcasting by means of 
artificial earth satellites, invoking by inference the equitable pro-
vision of article 33 of the agreement. 
The fact that article 2 of the 1967 Outer Space Principles 
Treaty provides that the space environment is not subject to na-
tional appropriation, did not prevent representatives of eight equa-
torial states from reaching agreement on the 1976 Bogata Declara-
tion. In that Declaration, they asserted that international space 
law allowed them to assert national sovereignty at geostationary 
orbital heights, a distance of 22,300 miles above the surface of the 
earth. Several of the equatorial states have made use of the 
COPUOS and W ARC forums in order to restate their claims. They 
have been unable to gather additional support.30 Undoubtably, 
these claims were more designed to augment the economic posi-
tions of the participating states than to influence the formation of 
a NIIO. Nonetheless, they do demonstrate that states are fully 
cognizant of the values associated with monopolistic controls over 
geostationary orbital positions and the radio spectrum. Such 
claims highlight the differences between monopolistic controls and 
distributions based on the sharing of uses. Up to the present, the 
claims of the equatorial states have not served to unduly politicize 
either the UN or the ITU. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The continued advances in science and technology during the 
present era have heightened awareness of the value of the invisi-
ble resources of the space environment. Through the use and ex-
ploitation of radio frequencies and geostationary orbital positions 
vast benefits can accrue to all mankind. The manner of 
29. U .N. Doc., supra note 27. 
30. Christol, The Geostationary Orbital Position as a Natural Resource of the Space 
Evnironment, 26 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 5 (1979); Christol, International Space Law 
and the Use of Natural Resources: Solar Energy, 15 REV. BELGE DE DROIT INT'L 28 (1980). 
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distributing and the distribution of such resources, as well as the 
benefits derived or to be derived from their exploitation, have pos-
ed important scientific, technological; political, legal, and security 
questions. Through such international institutions as the UN, ITU, 
and UNESCO demands have been made for a sharing of such re-
sources, with the expectation that users and exploiters may do so 
in a manner best suited to their interests. In determining what the 
several interests are, much deference will be accorded to the pre-
rogative of national choice. Such choice must, of necessity, be con-
ditioned by suitable concerns for the well-being of the entire world 
community. 
In determining the substance of community well-being it is 
clear that the content of the data, information, and ideas that are 
broadcast via electronic means can be freely disseminated as 
allowed by article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. It is equally clear that information ideas and their dissem-
ination within a given state, may be seen by that state as an ele-
ment of its national policy. Hence, in recent years a restrictive 
focus has been accorded to mass communications by states com-
posing the Eastern bloc and some of the lesser developed coun-
tries. This approach, limiting the free dissemination of ideas, has 
been opposed by the United States along with other countries. 
The impetus toward restrictions on free dissemination of data, in-
formation, and ideas has been identified with the NIIO. Paradox-
ically, the movement has been promoted as a means to advance 
mass communications. 
Many states seek wider participation in deciding on the dis-
tribution of radio frequencies and geostationary orbital positions. 
Many of these states support the restrictions identified with the 
NIIO. Unlike the United States, which possesses deep-seated con-
victions that prior restraints on the freedom of expression are 
harmful to the interests and values of its citizens, some of the 
states most energetic in their defense of a NIIO are either actually 
or potentially the most repressive regarding human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Thus, it is possible to imagine that an allot-
ment to such a state of a radio frequency allowing space telecom-
munications, either for domestic or international broadcasts, 
might result in broadcasts of materials possessing a highly propa-
gandistic content. 
Under such circumstances what should be the response of 
states committed to a more open society? Presumably members of 
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an open society have little to fear, even though the idea of control-
ing the substantive content of communications is repulsive to 
them. If they are convinced that the free dissemination of ideas is 
the first principle of their societies, they would be expected to con-
tend that their way of life, as explained and understood by them, 
would in any event prevail. Unlike states possessing fragile 
cultures and unable to respond effectively against outside in-
fluences, the members of the free world would argue that a world 
culture is constantly evolving. Democratic states, taking a long 
view of the future, would urge that this evolution will ultimately 
result in a blending of their emphasis on civil and political rights 
and liberties with the concerns over human needs deemed impor-
tant by states possessing different socio-economic organizations. 
Under such circumstances the proposals for a NIIO will be treated 
as another aspect of the ongoing ideological conflict, entitled to 
the same treatment as any other maneuver in that continuing dia-
logue. 
It may be more relevant to concentrate discussion on another 
subject, namely the distribution of the invisible resources be-
tween states presently possessing space resources and lesser de-
veloped countries. Undoubtedly, much hard bargaining lies ahead 
on this subject, with the ITU probably being the focal point for 
such negotiations. As suggested, it will be helpful to approach the 
problem of sharing of space resources by reference to equitable 
principles. Such principles do not require an equal sharing of 
resources and their benefits. The fact that states are equal in the 
sense of possessing national sovereignty does not mean that they 
thereby are automatically entitled to equal shares in areas of the 
universe and to the natural resources appertaining to that 
universe. 
While it may be appropriate and desirable to effect distribu-
tions so as to provide special consideration for the lesser devel-
oped countries, each decision permitting such benefits should take 
into account numerous factors. Several formulas were identified. 
Until a better one presents itself it will be possible to use the pro-
vision contained in article 11, para. 7(d) of the 1979 Moon Treaty, 
which demands that there shall be: "An equitable sharing by all 
States Parties in the benefits derived from those resources, 
whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries, as 
well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed 
either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the Moon, shall 
21
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be given special consideration." Such a formulation would allow 
for bargaining where decisions would be based on both needs and 
contributions. This is consistent with article 33 of the 1973 ITU 
Convention. That article identified efficiency and economy, along 
with equity, as considerations when dealing with radio frequencies 
and geostationary orbital positions. These criteria do not demand 
that states be treated as equals in the sharing of resources and 
benefits when they make different scientific and technological con-
tributions, are widely disparate in size, in populations, and differ 
in other economic and social conditions. An approach focusing on 
equitable considerations would allow for the continuation of bar-
gaining on the basis of demonstrable interests, values, wants, and 
needs. These have always been the hallmark of states torn be-
tween seeking to serve their own narrowly defined national in-
terests while at the same time confronting the needs of the larger 
interests of the entire world community. 
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